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Abstract
We argue that Go¨del’s completeness theorem is equivalent to completability of
consistent theories, and Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem is equivalent to the
fact that this completion is not constructive, in the sense that there are some
consistent and recursively enumerable theories which cannot be extended to
any complete and consistent and recursively enumerable theory. Though any
consistent and decidable theory can be extended to a complete and consistent
and decidable theory. Thus deduction and consistency are not decidable in
logic, and an analogue of Rice’s Theorem holds for recursively enumerable
theories: all the non-trivial properties of such theories are undecidable.
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Introduction
The incompleteness theorem of Kurt Go¨del has been regarded as the most sig-
nificant mathematical result in the twentieth century, and Go¨del’s complete-
ness theorem is a kind of the fundamental theorem of mathematical logic. To
avoid confusion between these two results, it is argued in the literature that the
completeness theorem is about the semantic completeness of first order logic,
and the incompleteness theorem is about the syntactic incompleteness of suf-
ficiently strong first order logical theories. In this paper we look at these two
theorems from another perspective. We will argue that Go¨del’s completeness
theorem is a kind of completability theorem, and Go¨del–Rosser’s incomplete-
ness theorem is a kind of incompletability theorem in a constructive man-
ner. By Go¨del’s semantic incompleteness theorem we mean the statement that
any sound and sufficiently strong and recursively enumerable theory is incom-
plete. By Go¨del–Rosser’s incompleteness theorem we mean the statement that
any consistent and sufficiently strong and recursively enumerable theory is in-
complete. Go¨del’s original incompleteness theorem’s assumption is between
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soundness and consistency; it assumes ω−consistency of sufficiently strong
and recursively enumerable theories which are to be proved incomplete.
It is noted in the literature that the existence of a non–recursive but re-
cursively enumerable set can prove Go¨del’s semantic incompleteness theo-
rem (see e.g. [Lafitte 2009] or [Li & Vita´nyi 2008]). This beautiful proof
is most likely first proposed by [Kleene 1936] and Church; below we will
give an account of this proof after Theorem 12. A clever modification of this
proof shows Go¨del–Rosser’s (stronger) incompleteness theorem, and in fact
provides an elementary and nice proof of Go¨del–Rosser’s theorem other than
the classical Rosser’s trick ([Rosser 1936]). This is called Kleene’s Symmet-
ric Form of Go¨del’s Incompleteness Theorem (see [Beklemishev 2010]) origi-
nally published in [Kleene 1950] and later in the book [Kleene 1952]. Indeed,
Go¨del’s semantic incompleteness theorem is equivalent to the existence of a
non–recursive but recursively enumerable set, and also Go¨del–Rosser’s (con-
structive) incompleteness theorem is equivalent to the existence of a pair of
recursively (effectively) inseparable recursively enumerable sets.
We will present a theory which is computability theoretic in nature, in a
first order language which does not contain any arithmetical operations like
addition or multiplication, nor set theoretic relation like membership nor sting
theoretic operation like concatenation. We will use a ternary relation symbol τ
which resembles Kleene’s T predicate and our theory resembles Robinson’s R
arithmetic (see [Tarski, et. al. 1953]). The proofs avoid using the diagonal (or
fixed–point) lemma which is highly counter–intuitive and a kind of ‘pulling a
rabbit out of the hat’ (see [Wasserman 2008]); the proofs are also constructive,
in the sense that given a recursively enumerable theory that can interpret our
theory one can algorithmically produce an independent sentence. For us the
simplicity of the proofs and elementariness of the arguments are of essential
importance. Though we avoid coding sentences and proofs and other syn-
tactic notions, coding programs is needed for interpreting the τ relation. We
also do not need any mathematical definition for algorithms or programs (like
recursive functions or Turing machines etc); all we need is the finiteness of
programs (every program is a finite string of ASCII∗ codes) and the finiteness
of input and time of computation (which can be coded or measured by natural
numbers). So, Church’s Thesis (that every intuitively computable function is
a recursive function, or a function defined rigorously in a mathematical frame-
work) is not used in the arguments.
∗http://www.ascii-code.com/
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Completeness and Completability
In mathematical logic, a theory is said to be a set of sentences, in a fixed lan-
guage (see e.g. [Chiswell & Hodges 2007]; in [Kaye 2007] for example the
word “theory” does not appear in this sense at all, and instead “a set of sen-
tences” is used). Sometimes a theory is required to be closed under (logical)
deduction, i.e., a set of sentences T is called a theory if for any sentence ϕ
which satisfies T ⊢ ϕ we have ϕ ∈ T (see e.g. [Enderton 2001]). Here,
by a theory we mean any set of sentences (not necessarily closed under de-
duction). Syntactic completeness of a theory is usually taken to be negation–
completeness: a theory T is complete when for any sentence ϕ, either T ⊢ ϕ
or T ⊢ ¬ϕ. Let us look at the completeness with respect to other connectives:
Definition 1 (Completeness) A theory T is called
• ¬−complete when for any sentence ϕ:
T ⊢ ¬ϕ ⇐⇒ T 6⊢ ϕ.
• ∧−complete when for any sentences ϕ and ψ:
T ⊢ ϕ ∧ ψ ⇐⇒ T ⊢ ϕ and T ⊢ ψ.
• ∨−complete when for any sentences ϕ and ψ:
T ⊢ ϕ ∨ ψ ⇐⇒ T ⊢ ϕ or T ⊢ ψ.
• → −complete when for any sentences ϕ and ψ:
T ⊢ ϕ→ ψ ⇐⇒ if T ⊢ ϕ then T ⊢ ψ.
• ∀−complete when for every formula ϕ(x):
T ⊢ ∀xϕ(x) ⇐⇒ for every t, T ⊢ ϕ(t).
• ∃−complete when for every formula ϕ(x):
T ⊢ ∃xϕ(x) ⇐⇒ for some t, T ⊢ ϕ(t). 
Let us note that the half of ¬−completeness is consistency: a theory is
called consistent when for every sentence ϕ, if T ⊢ ¬ϕ then T 6⊢ ϕ. Usually,
the other half is called completeness, i.e., when if T 6⊢ ϕ then T ⊢ ¬ϕ for
every sentence ϕ.
Remark 2 Any theory is ∧−complete and ∀−complete (in first–order logic).
Also, half of ∨,→, ∃−completeness holds for all theories T ; i.e.,
— if T ⊢ ϕ or T ⊢ ψ, then T ⊢ ϕ ∨ ψ;
— if T ⊢ ϕ→ ψ, then if T ⊢ ϕ then T ⊢ ψ;
— if T ⊢ ϕ(t) for some t, then T ⊢ ∃xϕ(x). 
A maximally consistent theory is a theory T which cannot properly be ex-
tended to a consistent theory; i.e., for any consistent theory T ′ which satisfies
T ⊆ T ′ we have T = T ′. The following is a classical result in mathematical
logic (see e.g. [van Dalen 2013]).
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Remark 3 A consistent theory is ¬−complete if and only if is ∨−complete if
and only if is → −complete if and only if is maximally consistent. 
Consistently maximizing a theory suggests using Zorn’s Lemma or (equiv-
alently) the Axiom of Choice, which is non–constructive in general. To see if
one can do it constructively or not, we need to introduce some other notions.
Before that let us note that ∃−completing a theory can be done constructively.
Remark 4 Any arbitrary first–order consistent theory can be extended (con-
structively) to another consistent ∃−complete theory. 
The main idea of the proof is that we add a countable set of constants
{c1, c2, · · · } to the language, and then enumerate all the couples of formulas
and variables in the extended language as 〈ϕ1, x1〉, 〈ϕ2, x2〉, · · · and finally
add the sentences ∃x1ϕ1 → ϕ(cl1/x1), ∃x2ϕ2 → ϕ(cl2/x2), · · · successively
to the theory, where in each step cli is the first constant which does not appear
in ϕ1, . . . , ϕi and has not been used in earlier steps (see e.g. [Enderton 2001]).
Let us note that ∃−complete theories are sometimes called Henkin theo-
ries or Henkin–complete or Henkin sets (see e.g. [van Dalen 2013]). These
are used for proving Go¨del’s Completeness Theorem by Henkin’s proof. The
theory of a structure is the set of sentences (in the language of that structure)
which are true in that structure. It can be seen that theories of structures are
(¬, ∃)−complete theories. Conversely, for any (¬, ∃)−complete theory T one
can construct a structure M such that T is the theory of M.
Remark 5 Any consistent theory can be extended to a (¬, ∃)−complete the-
ory. Note that any (¬, ∃)−complete theory is complete with respect to all the
other connectives. 
Go¨del’s completeness theorem is usually proved by showing that any con-
sistent theory has a model (the model existence theorem—which is equivalent
to the original completeness theorem). Note that for proving the model exis-
tence theorem it is shown that any consistent theory is extendible to a consis-
tent (¬, ∃)−complete theory, which then defines a structure which is a model
of that theory. Thus, we can rephrase this theorem equivalently as follows.
GO¨DEL’S COMPLETENESS THEOREM: Any first–order consistent theory can
be extended to a consistent (¬, ∃)−complete theory.
This theorem can be considered as the fundamental theorem of logic, the
same way that we have the fundamental theorem of arithmetic, or the funda-
mental theorem of algebra, or the fundamental theorem of calculus. We could
also call this theorem, Go¨del’s Completability Theorem, for the above reasons.
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Incompleteness and Incompletability
We now turn our attention to constructive aspects of the above theorem. A
possibly infinite set can be constructive when it is decidable or (at least) re-
cursively enumerable. A set D is decidable when there exists a single–input
algorithm which on any input x outputs Yes if x ∈ D and outputs No if
x 6∈ D. A set R is called recursively enumerable (RE for short) when there ex-
ists an input–free algorithm which outputs (generates) the elements ofR (after
running). It is a classical result in Computability Theory that there exists an RE
set which is not decidable (though, any decidable set is RE); see .e.g [Epstein
& Carnielli 2008]. For a theory T we can consider decidability or recursive
enumerability of either T as a set of sentences, or the set of derivable sentences
of T , i.e., Der(T ) = {ϕ | T ⊢ ϕ}. It can be shown that if T is decidable or
RE (as a set) then Der(T ) is RE; of course when Der(T ) is RE then T is RE
as well, and by Craig’s trick ([Craig 1953]) for such a theory there exists a
decidable set of sentences T̂ such that Der(T ) = Der(T̂ ). So, we consider RE
theories only, and call theory T a decidable theory when Der(T ) is a decidable
set (of sentences). RE theories are sometimes called axiomatizable theories (in
e.g. [Enderton 2001]). Below we will show that there exists some decidable
set of sentences (T ) whose set of derivable sentences is not decidable (though
it must be RE of course).
Definition 6 (RE, Decidable and RE–Completable) A consistent theory
• T is called an RE theory when Der(T ) is an RE set.
• T is called a decidable theory when Der(T ) is a decidable set.
• T is called RE–completable when there exists a theory T ′ extending T
(i.e., T ⊆ T ′) such that T ′ is consistent, complete and RE. 
It is a classical fact that complete RE theories are decidable (see e.g. [En-
derton 2001]): since by recursive enumerability of T both {ϕ | T ⊢ ϕ} and
{ϕ | T ⊢ ¬ϕ} are RE and by the completeness of T we have {ϕ | T 6⊢ ϕ} =
{ϕ | T ⊢ ¬ϕ}, so the set Der(T ) and its complement are both RE and hence
decidable (by Kleene’s Complementation Theorem – see e.g. [Berto 2009]).
Completeness is a logician’s tool for decidability. Henkin’s completion shows
that any RE decidable theory is RE–completable (see [Tarski, et. al. 1953]).
The main idea is that having a decidable theory T we list all the sentences in
the language of T as ϕ1, ϕ2, · · · and then add ϕi or ¬ϕi in the ith step to T as
follows: let T0 = T and if Tj is defined let Tj+1 = Tj ∪ {ϕj} if Tj ∪ {ϕj} is
consistent, otherwise let Tj+1 = Tj∪{¬ϕj}. Note that if Tj is consistent, then
Tj+1 will be consistent as well (if Tj ∪ {ϕj} is inconsistent then Tj ∪ {¬ϕj}
18(3), 2014, pp–qq.
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must be consistent). The theory T ′ = ⋃i>0 Ti will be consistent and complete.
This was essentially Henkin’s Construction for proving Go¨del’s completeness
theorem. The point is that if T is decidable then so is any Ti since they are
finite extensions of T . Finally, T ′ is a decidable theory, because for any given
sentence ϕ it should appear in the list ϕ1, ϕ2, · · · , so say ϕ = ϕn. Now, for
i = 1, 2, . . . , n we can decide whether ϕi ∈ T ′ or ¬ϕi ∈ T ′ inductively;
and finally we can decide whether T ′ ⊢ ϕ or not (T 6⊢ ϕ happens only when
T ′ ⊢ ¬ϕ). So, for consistent RE theories we have the following inclusions:
Complete =⇒ Decidable =⇒ RE–Completable
Below we will see that the converse conclusions do not hold (Remark 10).
Whence, by contrapositing the above conclusions we will have the following
inclusions and non–inclusions for some consistent RE theories:
=⇒ =⇒RE–Incompletable Undecidable Incomplete6⇐= 6⇐=
Incomplete theories abound in mathematics: every theory which has finite
models but does not fix the number of elements (e.g. theory of groups, rings,
fields, lattices, etc.) is an incomplete theory. By encoding Turing machines
into a first order language one can obtain an undecidable theory (see e.g. [Boo-
los, et. al. 2007]). But demonstrating an RE–incompletable theory is a difficult
task and it is in fact Go¨del’s Incompleteness Theorem. RE–incompletable the-
ories are know as “essentially undecidable” theories in the literature (starting
from [Tarski, et. al. 1953]). Comparing Go¨del’s Completeness Theorem with
his Incompleteness Theorem, we come to the following conclusion.
Every consistent theory can be extended to a (¬, ∃)−complete theory (Go¨del’s
Completeness Theorem) and this completion preserves decidability, i.e., every
consistent and decidable theory can be extended to a consistent, decidable and
(¬, ∃)−complete theory. But this completion cannot be necessarily effective;
i.e., there are some consistent RE theories whose all consistent completions
are non–RE (Go¨del’s Incompleteness Theorem).
So, calling the completeness theorem of Go¨del Completability Theorem
we can call (the first) incompleteness theorem of Go¨del (and Rosser) RE–
Incompletabiliy Theorem.
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An Undecidable but RE–Completable Theory
In this paper we introduce an incomplete but RE–completable theory (T ) and
a novel RE–incompletable theory (S), and for that we consider the theory of
zero, successor and order in the set of natural numbers, i.e., the structure
〈N, 0, s, <〉 in which 0 is a constant symbol, s is a unary function symbol
and < is a binary relation symbol (interpreted as the zero element, the succes-
sor function and the order relation, respectively). This theory is known to be
decidable ([Enderton 2001]), and in fact can be finitely axiomatized as follows
A1 : ∀x∀y(x < y → y 6< x),
A2 : ∀x∀y∀z(x < y ∧ y < z → x < z),
A3 : ∀x∀y(x < y ∨ x = y ∨ y < x),
A4 : ∀x∀y(x < y ←→ s(x) < y ∨ s(x) = y),
A5 : ∀x(x 6< 0),
A6 : ∀x
(
0 < x→ ∃v(x = s(v))
)
.
The axioms A1, A2, A3 state that < is a (linear and transitive and antisymmet-
ric, thus a) total ordering, A4 states that every element has a successor (the
successor s(x) of x satisfies ∀y
(
x < y ↔ s(x) < y ∨ s(x) = y
)), A5 states
that there exists a least element (namely 0) and finally A6 states that every
non–zero element has a predecessor. One other advantage of the language
{0, s, <} is that we have terms for every natural number n ∈ N:
n is the {0, s}−term sn0 = s · · · s︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−times
0.
To the language {0, s, <} we add a ternary relation symbol τ interpreted as:
for e, x, t ∈ N the relation τ(e, x, t) holds when
e is a code for a single–input program which halts on input x by time t.
Timing of a program can be measured either by the number of steps that the
program runs or just by the conventional seconds, minutes, hours, etc. and
programs (say in a fixed programming language like C++) can be coded by
natural numbers as follows (for example): Any such program is a (long) string
of ASCII codes, and every ASCII code can be thought of as 8 symbols of 0’s
and 1’s (so, there are 256 ASCII codes). So, any program is a string of 0’s and
1’s (whose length is a multiple of 8). The set of 0,1–strings can be coded by
natural numbers in the following way:
λ 0 1 00 01 10 11 000 001 010 011 100 · · ·
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 · · ·
This coding works as follows: given a string of 0’s and 1’s (take for example
0110), put a 1 at the beginning of it (in our example 10110) and compute
18(3), 2014, pp–qq.
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its binary value (in our example 2+22+24=22) and subtract 1 from it (in our
example 21) to get the natural number which is the code of the original string.
Conversely, given a natural number (for example 29) find the binary repre-
sentation of its successor (in our example 30=2+22+23+24=(11110)2) and re-
move the 1 from its beginning (in our example 1110) to get the 0,1–string
which corresponds to the given natural number.
Whence, any program can be coded by a natural number constructively,
and if a natural number is a code for a program, then that program can be
decoded from that number algorithmically. Let us note the ternary relation τ
resembles Kleene’s T Predicate (see [Kleene 1936]).
Definition 7 (The Theory T ) Theory T is axiomatized by A1, A2, A3, A4,
A5 and A6 with the following set of sentences in the language {0, s, <, τ}:
A7 : {τ(e, x, t) | e, x, t ∈ N & N |= τ(e, x, t)} 
The set of axioms A7 consists of the sentences τ(e, x, t) (recall that n is
the {0, s}−term representing the number n ∈ N) such that τ(e, x, t) holds in
reality (the single–input program with code e halts on input x by time t).
Remark 8 (RE–completability of T ) The set of sentences in T is decidable
(given any n,m, k one can decide whether τ(n,m, k) holds or not), and thus
T is an RE theory. It is also RE–completable, since its extension by the sen-
tence ∀x∀y∀z
(
τ(x, y, z)
)
is a decidable theory (equivalent to the theory of the
structure 〈N, 0, s, <〉 which is decidable – see [Enderton 2001]). 
The theory T is undecidable, since the halting problem is undecidable (see
e.g. [Epstein & Carnielli 2008]): for any (single–input program with code)
e ∈ N and any (input) m ∈ N, let ϕe,m be the sentence ∃z τ(e,m, z). Then
T ⊢ ϕe,m ⇐⇒ N |= τ(e,m, t) for some t
⇐⇒ the program e eventually halts on input m.
This can be shown directly, by incorporating the proof of the undecidability of
the halting problem.
Theorem 9 (Undecidability of T ) The theory T is undecidable.
Proof. If the set Der(T ) is decidable, then so is the set
D = {n ∈ N | T 6⊢ ∃z τ(n, n, z)}.
Whence, there exists a program which on input n ∈ N halts whenever n ∈ D
(and when n 6∈ D then the program does not halt and loops forever). Let e be
a code for this (single–input) program. Then
18(3), 2014, pp–qq.
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the program (with code) e halts on input e ⇐⇒ N |= τ(e, e, k) for some k
⇐⇒ T ⊢ ∃z τ(e, e, z) ⇐⇒ e 6∈ D ⇐⇒ (by e’s definition) the program
(with code) e does not halt on input e. Contradiction! ❏
Remark 10 Thus far, we have shown that an undecidable theory need not be
RE-incompletable (T ). One can also show that an incomplete theory need not
be undecidable; to see this consider the theory {∃x∃y∀z(z = x ∨ z = y)} in
the language of equality (=). This theory is decidable (holds in models of at
most two elements) but not complete, since can derive neither ∀x∀y(x = y)
nor ¬∀x∀y(x = y).
Corollary 11 (Undecidability of Consistency) It is not decidable whether a
given RE theory is consistent or not.
Proof. By [T ⊢ ϕ] ⇐⇒ [T ∪ {¬ϕ} is inconsistent] if consistency of RE
theories was decidable then every RE theory would be decidable too. ❏
Thus, we have shown the existence of an RE theory (T ) which is undecid-
able but RE–completable. Next, we show the existence of an RE theory which
is not RE–completable. Before that let us note that the above proof works for
any (consistent and RE) theory T ⊇ T which is sound (i.e., N |= T ).
Theorem 12 There exists no complete, sound and RE theory extending T . In
other words, the theory T cannot be soundly RE–completed. ❏
This is essentially the semantic form of Go¨del’s first incompleteness the-
orem. As a corollary we have that the theory of 〈N, 0, s, <, τ〉 is not RE (nor
decidable). Let us note that the above proof of the first (semantic) incom-
pleteness theorem of Go¨del is some rephrasing of Kleene’s proof (see [Kleene
1936]). For a (single–input) program (with code) e let We be the set of the
inputs such that e eventually halts on them, i.e., We={n | N |= ∃z τ(e, n, z)}.
By Turing’s results it is known that the set K = {n | n ∈ Wn} is RE but
not decidable (see e.g. [Epstein & Carnielli 2008]). Indeed, its complement
K = {n | n 6∈ Wn} is not RE because every RE set is of the form Wm
for some m (see e.g. [Epstein & Carnielli 2008]) and for any n we have
n ∈ (K \Wn) ∪ (Wn \K). On the other hand for any RE theory T the set
KT ={n | T ⊢ “n ∈ K”}={n | T ⊢ ¬∃z τ(n, n, z)}
is RE. Now, if T is sound (N |= T ) then KT ⊆ K. The inclusion must be
proper because one of them (KT ) is RE and the other one (K) is not RE. If
KT = Wm (for somem ∈ N) then m ∈ K−KT : because if m ∈ KT (=Wm)
thenm ∈ Wm and som 6∈ K, and this contradicts the inclusionKT ⊆ K; thus
m 6∈ KT and so m 6∈ Wm which implies that m ∈ K. Hence, the sentence
¬∃z τ(m,m, z) is true but unprovable in T ; thus T is incomplete.
18(3), 2014, pp–qq.
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An RE–Incompletable Theory
In the above arguments we used the soundness assumption of T (and T ).
Below, we will introduce a consistent and RE theory S which is not RE–
completable. Let pi be a binary function symbol (representing some pairing
– for example pi(n,m) = (n + m)2 + n) whose interpretation in N satisfies
the pairing condition: for any a, b, a′, b′ ∈ N we have N |= pi(a, b) = pi(a′, b′)
if and only if a = a′ and b = b′.
Definition 13 (The Theory S) The theory S is the extension of the theory T
by the following sets of sentences in the language {0, s, <, τ, pi}:
A8 : {¬τ(e, x, t) | e, x, t ∈ N & N 6|= τ(e, x, t)}
A9 : {∀x
(
x < k ←→
∨
i<k x = i
)
| k ∈ N} 
We now show that the theory S is not RE–completable. Let us note that
Go¨del’s original first incompleteness theorem showed the existence of some
theory which was not soundly RE–completable. Actually, Go¨del used a syntac-
tic notion weaker than “soundness”, namely ω−consistency, which is stronger
than consistency itself. Nowadays it is known that Go¨del’s proof works for an
even weaker condition than ω−consistency, the so called 1–consistency (see
[Isaacson 2011]). It was then Rosser who showed that Go¨del’s theorem can be
proved without using the ω−consistency (even 1-consistency) assumption (see
[Rosser 1936] or e.g. [Boolos, et. al. 2007]); so the theorem of Go¨del–Rosser
states the existence of a consistent and RE theory which is not RE–completable.
Theorem 14 (RE–incompletability of S) If T is a consistent RE theory that
extends S (i.e., T ⊇ S), then T is not complete.
Proof. Suppose T is a consistent and RE extension of S. We show that T is
not complete. For any a, b ∈ N let ϕa,b be the sentence
∃x
(
τ(a, pi(a, b), x) ∧ ∀y<x¬τ(b, pi(a, b), y)
)
.
Let m be a code of a program which on input p ∈ N halts if and only if there
are some k, l ∈ N such that p = pi(k, l) (in which case the numbers k and l are
unique) and there exists a proof of ϕk,l in T (i.e., T ⊢ ϕk,l). So, if (i) p is not in
the range of the function pi, or (ii) there are (unique) k, l such that p = pi(k, l)
and T 6⊢ ϕk,l, then the program does not halt on p. Whence, the program with
code m searches for a proof of ϕk,l in T on input pi(k, l).
Also, let n be a code for a program which for an input p ∈ N halts if and
only if there are some (unique) k, l ∈ N such that p = pi(k, l) and there exists a
proof of ¬ϕk,l in T (i.e., T ⊢ ¬ϕk,l). So, if p is not in the range of the function
pi or if there are (unique) k, l such that p = pi(k, l) and T 6⊢ ¬ϕk,l then the
18(3), 2014, pp–qq.
Go¨del’s Incompleteness Phenomenon—Computationally 11
program with code n does not halt on p. Again, this program searches for a
proof of ¬ϕk,l in T on input pi(k, l).
We prove that ϕn,m is independent from T , i.e., T 6⊢ ϕn,m and T 6⊢ ¬ϕn,m.
(1) If T ⊢ ϕn,m then by the consistency of T we have T 6⊢ ¬ϕn,m. So,
on input pi(n,m) the program with code m halts and the program with code
n does not halt. Whence, for some natural number t, N |= τ(m, pi(n,m), t)
and for every natural number s, N 6|= τ(n, pi(n,m), s). So by A7 and A8 for
that (fixed) t ∈ N we have T ⊢ τ(m, pi(n,m), t), and for every s ∈ N we have
T ⊢ ¬τ(n, pi(n,m), s). Thus, T ⊢
∧
i6t¬τ(n, pi(n,m), i), and so by A9, we
conclude that T ⊢ ∀x6 t¬τ(n, pi(n,m), x), therefore
(i) T ⊢ ∀x(τ(n, pi(n,m), x)→x>t).
Also by T ⊢ τ(m, pi(n,m), t) we get
(ii) T ⊢ ∀x>t(∃y<x τ(m, pi(n,m), y)).
Combining these two conclusions we infer that
T ⊢ ∀x
(
τ(n, pi(n,m), x)→ ∃y<x τ(m, pi(n,m), y)
)
.
On the other hand by the definition of ϕa,b we have
ϕn,m ≡ ∃x
(
τ(n, pi(n,m), x) ∧ ∀y<x¬τ(m, pi(n,m), y)
)
,
and so ¬ϕn,m ≡ ∀x
(
τ(n, pi(n,m), x)→ ∃y<x τ(m, pi(n,m), y)
)
.
Thus we deduced T ⊢ ¬ϕn,m from the assumption T ⊢ ϕn,m; contradiction!
Whence, T 6⊢ ϕn,m.
(2) If T ⊢ ¬ϕn,m then (again) by the consistency of T we have T 6⊢ ϕn,m.
So, on input pi(n,m) the program with code n halts and the program with code
m does not halt. Whence, for some natural number t, N |= τ(n, pi(n,m), t)
and for every natural number s, N 6|= τ(m, pi(n,m), s). Similarly to the above
we can conclude that T ⊢ τ(n, pi(n,m), t) and T ⊢ ∀y<t¬τ(m, pi(n,m), y).
Thus (for x = t) we have
T ⊢ ∃x
(
τ(n, pi(n,m), x) ∧ ∀y<x¬τ(m, pi(n,m), y)
)
or T ⊢ ϕn,m; contradiction! So, T 6⊢ ¬ϕn,m.
Whence, T is not complete. ❏
The above proof is effective, in the sense that given an RE theory (by a code
for a program that generates its elements) that extends S one can generate
(algorithmically) a sentence which is independent from that theory. Let us
note that for proving RE–incompletability of theories, it suffices to interpret S
in them. So, the theories Q, R (see [Tarski, et. al. 1953]) and Peano’s Arithmetic
PA are all RE–incompletable (or, essentially undecidable).
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Rice’s Theorem for RE Theories
In this last section we show a variant of Rice’s Theorem for logical theories.
In [Oliveria & Carnielli 2008] the authors (claimed to) had shown that an
analogue of Rice’s theorem holds for finitely axiomatizable first order theories.
Unfortunately, the result was too beautiful to be true ([Oliveria & Carnielli
2009]) and it turned out that Rice’s theorem cannot hold for finite theories.
However, we show that this theorem holds for RE theories, a result which is
not too different from Rice’s original theorem. Recall that two theories T1 and
T2 are equivalent when they prove the same (and exactly the same) sentences
(i.e., Der(T1) = Der(T2)).
Definition 15 (Property of Theories) A property of (first order logical) theo-
ries is a set of natural numbers P ⊆ N such that for anym, n ∈ N if the theory
generated by the program with code m is equivalent to the theory generated
by the program with code n, then m ∈ P ←→ n ∈ P .
So, a theory is said to have the property P when a code for generating its
set belongs to P . A property of theories is a non–trivial property when some
theories have that property and some do not. 
Example 16 The followings are some non–trivial properties of RE theories:
• Universal Axiomatizability: theories axiomatizable by sentences of the
form ∀x1 . . .∀xnθ(x1, . . . , xn) for quantifier–free θ’s;
• Finite Axiomatizability: being equivalent to a finite theory;
• Decidability (of the set of the theorems of the theory);
• Having a Finite Model;
• Completeness;
• Consistency. 
Remark 17 For any non–trivial property P either (i) no inconsistent theory
has the property P or (ii) all inconsistent theories have the property P . Be-
cause when an inconsistent theory breaks into P then all the other inconsistent
theories (being equivalent to each other) come in. 
Before proving Rice’s Theorem let us have a look at (a variant of) Craig’s
trick. For an RE theory T = {T1, T2, T3, · · · } the proof predicate “p is a
proof of ϕ in T ”, for given sequence of sentences p and sentence ϕ, might
not be decidable when the set {T1, T2, T3, · · · } is not decidable. Note that “the
sequence p is a proof of ϕ in T ” when every element of p is either a (first order)
logical axiom (which can be decided) or is an element of T or can be deduced
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from two previous elements by an inference rule, and the last element of p is
ϕ. Thus decidability of the set T is essential for the decidability of the proof
sequences of T . But if we consider the theory T̂ = {T̂1, T̂2, T̂3, · · · } where
T̂m =
∧
i6m Ti then the set T̂ is decidable, because if A is an algorithm that
outputs (generates) the infinite sequence 〈T1, T2, T3, · · · 〉 in this order (in case
T is finite the sequence is eventually constant), then for any given sentence
ψ we can decide if ψ ∈ T̂ or not by checking if ψ is a conjunction of some
sentences ψ = ψ1∧· · ·∧ψm (if ψ is not of this form, then already ψ 6∈ T̂ ) such
that A’s ith output is ψi for i = 1, . . . , m (if not then again ψ 6∈ T̂ ). Whence
the predicate of being a proof of ϕ in T̂ , i.e., “the sequence p is a proof of
sentence ϕ in T̂ ”, is decidable; moreover the theories T and T̂ are equivalent,
and the theory T̂ can be algorithmically constructed from given theory T .
Theorem 18 (Analogue of Rice’s Theorem) All the non–trivial properties of
RE theories are undecidable.
Proof. Assume a non–trivial property P of RE theories is decidable, i.e., there
exists an algorithm which on input n ∈ N decides whether n ∈ P (i.e.,
whether the theory generated by the program with code n has the property
P). Without loss of generality we can assume that no inconsistent theory has
the property P (otherwise take the complement of P). Fix a consistent RE
theory, say, S = {S1, S2, S3, · · · } that has the property P (S could be finite
in which case the sequence {Si}i is eventually constant) and fix a sentence
ψ. For any given RE theory T we construct the theory T ′ = {T ′1, T ′2, T ′3, · · · }
as follows: let T ′k = Sk if k is not a (code of a) proof of ψ ∧ ¬ψ in T̂ (see
above); otherwise let T ′k = ψ ∧¬ψ. Note that this construction is algorithmic,
since being a (code for a) proof of ψ ∧ ¬ψ in the decidable set T̂ is decidable
(and the theory T̂ can be constructed algorithmically for a given RE theory T );
moreover, the theory T ′ is RE. Now, if T is consistent then T ′ = S has the
property P and if T is not consistent then T ′ is an inconsistent theory (because
then for some k, T ′k = ψ ∧¬ψ) and so does not have the property P . Whence,
for any RE theory T we have the RE theory T ′ in such a way that[
T is consistent
]
⇐⇒
[
T ′ has the property P
]
.
Now by Corollary 11 the property P is not decidable. ❏
Finally, we note that as a corollary to the above theorem, finite axiomatiz-
ability of RE theories is not a decidable property; and there exists a decidable
non–trivial property for finite theories: for a fixed decidable theory (like the
theory {A1, · · · , A6} in Definition 7), say F , it is decidable whether a given
finite theory T is included in F (i.e., if F can prove all the sentences of T ).
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